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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Maroff Ouedraogo appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Ouedraogo with possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to deliver, second degree kidnapping, and domestic violence. (R.,
p.32.

1)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ouedraogo pied guilty to possession of a

controlled substance with intent to deliver and misdemeanor disturbing the
peace.

(R., p.22; 5/31/12 audio of change of plea hearing.)

The remaining

charges were dismissed and the state agreed to recommend a period of retained
jurisdiction with an underlying sentence of two years fixed plus three years
indeterminate. (5/31/12 audio of change of plea hearing.)
The court retained jurisdiction with an underlying five-year unified
sentence with the first two and one-half years fixed.

(R., p.22.) Following

Ouedraogo's participation in the retained jurisdiction program, the court placed
him on four years of probation. (Id.)
Ouedraogo filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief arguing his
counsel was ineffective for "affirmatively misadvis[ing]" him of the consequences

In this case, there is a Clerk's Record on Appeal, Augment Clerk's Record, and
Second Augment Clerk's Record. The two augmentations include a combined
12 page addition to the record: pages 60-71. Citations in this brief will be made
to the 71-page Second Augment Clerk's Record on Appeal but will be referenced
simply as "R."
1
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of his guilty plea on his immigration status, and as such, his plea was "not
knowing or intelligently made." (R., p.4.) The state filed an answer requesting
Ouedraogo's petition be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. (R., pp.13-17.)
The court filed a notice of intent to dismiss directing Ouedraogo to
supplement the record with the specific advice he was given by trial counsel
regarding his guilty plea and immigration status and why he believed that advice
to be incorrect. (R., p.28.) Ouedraogo filed an affidavit with the court asserting
his attorney "stated that there may be immigration consequences to [his]
conviction," and that Ouedraogo would "have to plead guilty and then have an
immigration attorney fight to keep [him] from being deported." (R., p.33.) The
court found Ouedraogo failed to establish he was affirmatively misled by his trial
counsel of the possible immigration consequences of his plea. (R., pp.40-48.)
Instead, the court noted Ouedraogo attempted to change his argument:
However, despite the clear directive of the Court, the
petitioner's affidavit abandons the claim of affirmative misadvice.
Instead, he concedes that counsel warned him that his plea could
carry adverse immigration consequences (advice that is factually
correct), but argues that his advice did not go far enough under
Padilla.
(R., p.45.)

The court dismissed Ouedraogo's petition for post-conviction relief finding
his petition as supplemented raised no genuine issue of material fact entitling
Ouedraogo to an evidentiary hearing.
judgment. (R., pp.49-56.)

2

Ouedraogo appeals from the final

ISSUE
Ouedraogo states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr.
Ouedraogo's petition for post-conviction relief as he provided
undisputed evidence demonstrating that this trial counsel
affirmatively misadvised him about the immigration consequences
of his guilty plea and that, but for this misadvice, he would not have
pied guilty?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Ouedraogo failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief?

3

ARGUMENT
Ouedraogo Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Ouedraogo challenges the district court's summary dismissal of his post-

conviction petition.

Specifically, Ouedraogo asserts the district court erred in

determining he was not "affirmatively misadvised" by counsel, thus leading to his
plea of guilty.

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-10.)

Ouedraogo's argument that the

district court should have granted him relief on the theory that counsel had
informed him that his guilty plea might result in his deportation is without merit
because counsel's statements were neither incorrect nor prejudicial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore the
applicant's allegations must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. When appellate review of a district court's denial of postconviction relief follows an evidentiary hearing, rather than a
summary dismissal, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to
the trial court's findings. On review, this Court will not disturb the
district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
However, this Court exercises free review of the district court's
application of the relevant law to the facts. If a district court
reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will
affirm the order upon the correct theory. Additionally, constitutional
issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises
free review.

Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _ , 321 P.3d 709, 713-714 (2014) (internal
quotes and citations omitted).

4

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is
entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983); Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App.
1999). Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief. Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221;
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995).
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), a district court may sua sponte dismiss a
post-conviction application when the court is satisfied that the applicant is not
entitled to relief.

Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221.

In such

instances, the court must give the petitioner notice of the reasons for its
contemplated dismissal, and an opportunity, within 20 days, to respond.

I.C. §

19-4906(b); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797
(1995); Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 P.2d at 1221. The purpose of the 20day notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to ensure that the applicant will
have an opportunity to challenge an adverse decision before it becomes final.
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 158, 715 P.2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 1986);
Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758,759,653 P.2d 813,814 (Ct. App. 1982).
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D.

Ouedraogo Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner

must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); Murray, 156 Idaho at_, 321 P.3d at 714. To establish a deficiency,
the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Murray, 156 Idaho at_, 321
P.3d at 714; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988);
Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To
establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for
the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been
different. Murray, 156 Idaho at_, 321 P.3d at 714; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 442,
163 P.3d at 231.

Where the defendant was convicted upon a guilty plea, to

satisfy the prejudice element the claimant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pied guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985);
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 621, 262 P.3d 255, 264 (2011 ).
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010), the Supreme Court of
the United States held "that counsel must inform her client whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation." "[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear
... the duty to give correct advice is equally clear," but "[w]hen the law is not
succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no more
than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of
6

adverse immigration consequences."
to

establish

how

he was

~

at 369.

Because Ouedraogo has failed

"affirmatively misadvised"

of the

immigration

consequences of his plea, the district court correctly found counsel has met her
obligation by advising Ouedraogo there "may be immigration consequences." (R.,
p.41.)
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Ouedraogo alleged that his plea
was not entered knowingly or intelligently because his attorney "affirmatively
misadvised [him] of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea." (R., p.4.)
In its notice of intent to dismiss Ouedraogo's petition for post-conviction relief, the
district court provided Ouedraogo with 20 days to "supply an amended petition or
further supporting affidavit reciting specifically what advice he was given by his
trial counsel concerning the immigration consequences of his plea and why he
believes it was incorrect." (R., p.28 (emphasis original.) Ouedraogo responded
by filing an affidavit asserting his attorney advised him "that there may be
immigration consequences to [his] conviction," and that he would "have to plead
guilty and then have an immigration attorney fight to keep [him] from being
deported." (R., p.33.) The district court dismissed Ouedraogo's petition for postconviction relief finding he had failed to support his claim that he was
"affirmatively misadvised" by counsel regarding the possible consequences of his
guilty plea on his immigration status. (R., p.45.)
Ouedraogo's argues that his "trial counsel affirmatively and falsely told
[him] that there was a possibility that he would not be deported if he pied guilty to
his drug offense, where in fact, ... his deportation was presumptively mandatory."
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(Appellant's brief, p.8 (internal quotation marks and case citation not included).)
This is not supported by the record. As outline in his affidavit, Ouedraogo's trial
counsel advised him there might be immigration consequences and that he
would likely need to hire an immigration lawyer to fight extradition. (R., p.33.) At
the change of plea hearing, the trial court asked Ouedraogo if his counsel had
explained the consequences of his plea.

(5/31/12 audio of change of plea.)

Ouedraogo replied she had and also replied he understood when the court
advised him there may be immigration consequences with his plea of guilty. (Id.)
Additionally, trial counsel advised Ouedraogo he would need to have an
immigration attorney "fight to keep [him] from being deported." (Id.) Instead of
advising him he might not be deported, as Ouedraogo claims, the advice clearly
indicates deportation is something he would face.
Ouedraogo argues his deportation was imminent.

The only support for

this statement is his Ouedraogo's claim that "in my first appearance in
immigration court ... I was told I could not ask for any type of relief from
deportation" because "of the type of conviction I had." (R., p.34.) Ouedraogo's
assertion on appeal that his deportation was presumptively mandatory assumes
that the only relevant step in this process is the immigration judge's
determination that the individual is removable, and that the ability to actually
remove the individual is irrelevant. This reads Padilla too narrowly, and would
lead to the absurd result that where the defendant is deemed removable by the
judge but never actually removed, the attorney who inaccurately advised a client
he would be deported would be deemed effective while the attorney who

8

accurately predicted the person would not be deported is deemed ineffective.
Ouedraogo has not demonstrated that the district court erred by concluding he
failed to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him that
deportation was a possibility (as opposed to a sure thing) if he pied guilty.
Even if his attorney could theoretically have given better legal advice, her
advice was correct, and therefore there can be no prejudice. Ouedraogo had the
burden of showing "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted).
To obtain relief he has to "convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 559 U.S. at
372 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
Ouedraogo's only evidence of prejudice was his assertion that "If I had
been informed, and known the true severity of the consequences of my pleading
guilty to the crime I was charged with, I would have never pleaded guilty, but
would have fought this case before the criminal court." (R., p. 34.) Counsel's
alleged affirmative misinformation was that Ouedraogo's conviction "may [have]
immigration consequences" (Id.), and that he would likely have to fight
deportation instead of informing him that he would legally be subject to
deportation. To the extent there is any legally significant difference between the
advice that should have been given and that actually given, such was not
prejudicial.
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Moreover, Ouedraogo has presented no theory by which he would have
been better off rejecting the state's plea offer and going to trial. He was no less
subject to deportation after a guilty verdict than after a guilty plea and he
accepted an offer from the state which dismissed two very serious offenses he
was facing-kidnapping and domestic battery.

Ouedraogo presented no

evidence that going to trial would have better addressed the potential immigration
consequences than pleading guilty.

His naked claim that he would not have

entered the plea (R., p.34) does not show a rational basis for choosing a trial
over a guilty plea based on the alleged erroneous advice.

Ouedraogo has

therefore failed to demonstrate that he proved any prejudice from the advice in
fact given by counsel and reiterated by the trial court.
Ouedraogo has failed to show any error by the district court in determining
that his petition as supplemented raised no genuine issues of material fact.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
and judgment summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of October, 2014, served a
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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